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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Plaintiffs/Appellants Mr. and Mrs. Alcazar filed their original Notice of Appeal
on January 17,2007. The trial court vacated its original judgment and entered judgment on
May 21, 2007. A timely First Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on June 4, 2007. See
Order of The Utah Court of Appeals dated June 6, 2007. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 4, Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the trial court err in declining to follow the holdings of the Utah Court
of Appeals in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and Evans v. Doty,
824 P.2d460,462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)? Do plaintiffs
in medical negligence cases still have the right, established by these cases, to voir dire of
potential jurors on their exposure to reports of medical negligence cases and the impact of
medical negligence cases, including the purported detrimental effect that awards in these
cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of insurance, and the ability and
willingness of medical providers to practice medicine?
2.

Does the trial court's disallowance of voir dire inquiry on the exposure

of prospective jurors to reports about medical negligence cases constitute reversible error,
where plaintiffs in a medical negligence action were unable to discover prospective jurors'
exposure to and biases from such reports?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Stare decisis is a cardinal principle of American jurisprudence, including the
jurisprudence of the State of Utah. A lower court is bound to follow precedent established
by a higher court.
Also, as set forth by the Utah Court of Appeals,
We review challenges to the trial court's management of jury
voir dire under an abuse of discretion standard. Evans v. Doty,
824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1992); Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah
App. 1989). Generally, the trial court is afforded broad
discretion in conducting voir dire, "but that discretion must be
exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice
in prospective jurors." State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). See also State
v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991) (noting
importance of voir dire process in eliminating bias and
prejudice from trial proceedings). This court will overturn a
trial court's discretionary rejection of voir dire questions only
upon a showing that "the abuse of discretion rose to the level
of reversible error." Hall, 797 P.2d at 472. A trial court
commits reversible error when, '"considering the totality of
the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate
jurors.'" Evans, 824 P.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)).
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this medical negligence action, the trial court declined to follow the Utah
Court of Appeals' precedents in Barrett and Evans, supra, and rejected the Alcazars'
requested voir dire questions designed to elicit prospective jurors exposure to and biases
from reports and discussions of medical negligence cases. The jury was then empaneled, and
after trial between November 13-16, 2006, returned a defense verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At 1:40 a.m. on May 4, 2002, forty-six-year-old, Plaintiff Crescendo

Alcazar presented to the University of Utah Emergency Department ("ED") complaining of
chest pain. R. 318, R. 1316.
2.

Mr. Alcazar explained that he had been experiencing chest pain

intermittently for the past three days. R. 319, R. 31316.
3.

The ED noted that Mr. Alcazar's pain was in the left chest, of a burning

quality, associated with shortness of breath, and had reached a severity of 8-9/10. R. 3110,
R. 1316.
4.

The ED noted that Mr. Alcazar's chest pain occurred at rest, that there

were no exacerbating or relieving factors, and that left arm tingling was an associated
symptom. R. 3111, R. 1316.
5.

Defendants failed to consider heart disease in their differential diagnosis

and failed to perform laboratory tests to rule out an impending heart attack. Id. 114.
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6.

Defendants diagnosed Mr. Alcazar with "atypical chest pain" and sent

him home. R. 3115, R. 1319.
7.

Within 12 hours of being sent home, Mr. Alcazar suffered a heart attack.

8.

Mr. and Mrs. Alcazar commenced action on December 23,2003. R. 1-

9.

One week prior to the start of trial, the Alcazars submitted Plaintiffs'

Id. 116

6.

First Amended Requested Voir Dire of Potential Jurors. R. 359-363, Addendum 1.
10.

The Alcazars' requested voir dire included the following questions

designed to elicit potential jurors' exposure to reports and discussions about medical
negligence cases and the so-called "medical malpractice crisis", including the purported
detrimental effect that awards in these cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of
insurance, and the ability and willingness of medical providers to practice medicine:
Question No. 1.
Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper
method of resolving disputes concerning compensation for negligent
medical care? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 781 P.2d 445
(Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 2.
Have any of you watched, read, or
heard anything that suggests a "lawsuit crisis" or the need for "tort
reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans
v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in chambers].
a.
Do you think the article, program, etc. made some
good points?
b.
Did you agree with the points made? Please
explain [in chambers].
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c.
Would you be inclined to reduce the damage
award, if any, in this case, because of what you have watched, read or
heard? Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 3.
Have any of you watched, read or
heard anything which suggests that jury verdicts are too high or
unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of
jurors in chambers.)
a.
Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are
unreasonable?
b.
Do you believe that monetary limits should be
placed upon the amounts which a jury can award to an individual who
sues for personal injuries?

Question No. 5.
Have any of you watched, read, or
heard anything to indicate that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal
injury or medical malpractice cases result in higher insurance
premiums, effect the availability of insurance, or result in higher
medical costs for consumers? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah
App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please
explain [in chambers].
a.
What do you remember about it? Please explain
[in chambers],
b.
Do you think the article, program, etc. made some
good points? Please explain [in chambers].
c.
Do you personally believe that jury verdicts for
plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in higher insurance premiums
or effect the availability of insurance? Please explain [in chambers].
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans v. Doty,
824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991).

Question No. 8.
Do any of you have any negative
feelings about lawyers who seek compensation for those who have
suffered medical malpractice? Please explain.
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Question No. 11. Have you or any of your close
relatives or friends worked or do you or they now work in any aspect
of the insurance industry (insurance salesman, employee of an
insurance company, adjuster, underwriter, or anything similar)? Please
explain. If yes, would that effect the way you might view this case?
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991).

Question No. 15.
Have you or a close friend or relative
ever been sued in a medical malpractice lawsuit? Please explain.
R. 359-363, Addendum 1.
11.

At a pretrial conference on November 7, 2006 the court reviewed and

ruled on the Alcazars' requested voir dire of potential jurors. R. 560.
12.

The court ruled that it would not give any of the Alcazars' questions

designed to discover potential jurors' exposure to reports of medical negligence cases and
a medical malpractice crisis, including the questions quoted above, Nos. 1,2,3,5, 8,11, and
15 and their sub-parts. R. 560, pp. 3-7, Addendum 2.
13.

When the Alcazars attempted to persuade the court to give the questions,

arguing their need and the right, under Utah appellate court law, to discover potential jurors'
exposure to reports of medical negligence cases, the court declined to follow that law,
expressing a different philosophical approach to voir dire. R. 560, pp. 7-10, Addendum 2.
14.

During voir dire, prospective jurors were not questioned about their

exposure to reports or discussions of medical negligence cases, including the purported
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detrimental effect that awards in these cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of
insurance, and the ability and willingness of doctors to practice medicine. R. 758, pp. 3-122.
15.

The jury was then empaneled and the case tried between November 13-

16, 2006, which resulted in a defense verdict. R. 419-20.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
The trial court erred during voir dire of the matter at bar, by declining to follow
the holdings of the Utah Court of Appeals in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,98 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) and Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460,462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1992). These cases establish the right of plaintiffs in medical negligence actions
to discover exposure of prospective jurors to reports and discussions of medical negligence
cases (a.k.a. "medical malpractice crisis"), including the purported detrimental effect these
cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of insurance, and the ability and
willingness of medical providers to practice medicine.
Rejecting the requested voir dire that the Alcazars had prepared pursuant to
Barrett and Evans, the trial court believed the better approach was not to ask such questions
so as not to suggest anything to prospective jurors about these much-discussed issues.
However, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the trial court did not have discretion to ignore
the Utah Court of Appeals' precedents and follow its own philosophy on jury selection.
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POINT II.
The trial court's failure to give the Alcazars' requested voir dire or otherwise
elicit prospective jurors' exposure to reports and discussion of medical negligence cases was
prejudicial error, since the Alcazars' right to the informed exercise of their peremptory
challenges was substantially impaired. Barrett at 103. The voir dire performed by the trial
court did not compensate for this failure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STARE DECISIS REQUIRED THAT THE TRIAL COURT
QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS ON THEIR
EXPOSURE TO REPORTS OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
CASES AND THEIR EFFECT.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a trial court errs when it fails to abide by
the precedents established by a higher court in the jurisdiction. The trial court erred in the
matter at bar by declining to follow the precedents established by the Utah Court of Appeals
in Barrett and Evans. These cases hold that plaintiffs in medical negligence cases must be
allowed to discover whether prospective jurors have read, seen, or heard information on the
impact of medical negligence cases or tort reform:
We hold only that in cases such as this one, the plaintiff
is entitled during voir dire to elicit information from
prospective jurors as to whether they have read or heard
information generally on medical negligence or tort
reform, and to follow up with appropriate questions if
affirmative responses are received.
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The trial court's failure to ask prospective jurors
threshold questions sufficient to elicit information on the
jurors' possible exposure to tort-reform and medical
negligence information prevented appellant from
detecting possible bias and from intelligently exercising
his peremptory challenges. The trial court's limitation of
voir dire questioning substantially impaired appellant's
right to the informed exercise of his peremptory
challenges, and therefore constitutes reversible error. The
judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, and the case is
remanded for a new trial.
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also, Evans v. Doty, 824
P.2d 460, 467(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Prior to selection of the jury in the case at bar, the Alcazars submitted requested
voir dire questions to the court, based upon the holdings in Barrett and Evans, to discover
prospective jurors' exposure to published reports and discussions of medical negligence
cases, and the possible biases resulting therefrom. R. 359-362, Addendum 1. However, the
court rejected all of the Alcazars' proposed voir dire in this regard. R. 560, pp. 3-7,
Addendum 2. Explaining its rejection, the court stated its view that such questions were
calculated to improperly influence the jury pool. R. 560, p. 8. When the Alcazars attempted
to remind the trial court of their right to such voir dire and to explain the need for such voir
dire, the court expressed a different philosophical approach, which meant remaining silent
on the topic:
MR. RATY: Could I - and I don't want to argue with
you on this point, Your Honor THE COURT: Well then don't.
MR. RATY: Then don't? Can I say one last thing.
-9-

THE COURT: If you want to make a record, go ahead.
MR. RATY: Okay, just very briefly, I think there's a fine
balance between suggesting things to the jury pool and
discovering prejudices and biases, which would allow us to
intelligently exercise our peremptory challenges, and I think that
case law, Your Honor, and I've cited several of those cases,
support the need, especially in our present climate so much
discussion about doctors going out of business because of
medical malpractice cases, and THE COURT: I mean do you want to tell the panel, are
you worried about doctors going out of business because of
medical malpractice? Is that the kind of thought you want to put
in their mind?
MR RATY: Well, what I'm afraid of is this THE COURT: You want to put in their mind that your
medical costs are going to go up because of, you know, it's like
saying to a kid don't put beans in your ears, you know, they're
going to say, "Hey, that's an idea", you know, and that's what
you're doing, and I think it can hurt the plaintiff as much as it
can hurt the defendant and it makes, it creates kind of a random
damage outcome that you can't predict, and again I've seen
enough juries over the last 40 years, that you know, I think I
know how they generally react and I think in this instance, as I
said before, you will know which people to challenge
peremptorily by the time we get to that point.
R. 560, pp. 9:2-10:6.
What the Alcazars' counsel was afraid of and tried to express to the court
before being cut off, was that the so-called "medical malpractice crisis" has been so widely
reported in the news media and so heavily discussed during political campaigns, that
prospective jurors had likely already been exposed to such reports and information, and
perhaps had developed the biases which seem so prevalent in society. It was important, and
frankly, under Barrett and Evans, the Alcazars had the right to know whether prospective
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jurors had read, heard, or seen such reports, and, if so, what the reports said, and what the
prospective jurors thought about them. This information, as acknowledged by Barrett and
Evans\ was critical to allow the Alcazars to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges
and possibly secure excuses for cause. Barrett at 102, Evans at 467. In Evans, the court
explained,
In tort cases, and more particularly in medical
malpractice cases, we cannot ignore the reality that
potential jurors may have developed tort-reform biases as
a result of an overall exposure to such propaganda.
Accordingly, in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a
legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have
read or heard information generally on medical
negligence or tort reform....
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda
may foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective
jurors, and, had [plaintiff] been able to identify those
jurors exposed to such propaganda, she could have more
intelligently exercised her peremptory challenges.
Evans at 467. (Citations omitted). In Barretty the court added,
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform
information, and the corresponding potential for general
exposure to such information by potential jurors, a
plaintiff is entitled to know which potential jurors, if any,
have been so exposed. Plaintiff is entitled to such
information absent any particular showing of specific
campaigns, advertisements, or literature offered for the
purpose of showing potential prejudice. Failure to ask
such questions ignores the plaintiffs "need to gather
information to assist in exercising . . . peremptory
challenges."
Barrett at 101. (Citations omitted).
-11-

True to its expressed intention, the court did not elicit any information from the
prospective jurors about their exposure to reports and discussion of medical negligence cases.
The court rejected all of the Alcazars' requested voir dire. The Alcazars' protestations
apparently did, however, lead the court to ask one token question on the topic: "Has any of
you or a close friend or relative personally formed an opinion either in favor of or opposed
to tort reform or been a member of any organization that has?" R. 57:10-12. This, of course,
was not the type of threshold question required by Barrett and Evans to discover what the
prospective jurors had heard, read, or seen by way of reports and discussion of medical
negligence cases and tort reform. It only asked jurors if they had formed an opinion in favor
or opposed to tort reform. Not surprisingly, the only prospective-juror response elicited from
asking the esoteric term "tort reform" in isolation was, "What is tort reform?" R. 758, p. 57:
13. However, rather than explain what the term meant and then ask prospective jurors
regarding their exposure to reports of a medical malpractice crisis, the court said simply, "I
thought we'd get questions. If you don't know what it is, you don't need to worry about it,
okay?" R. 758, p. 57:14-16. Thus ended the court's inquiry on prospective juror exposure
to reports of medical negligence cases and their effect, and the Alcazars were left without any
information on these important matters to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges
in their medical negligence case.
The trial court violated stare decisis and erred by declining to engage in the
voir dire required by Barrett and Evans. The court also abused whatever discretion it may
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have had on the matter since "'that discretion must be exercised in favor of allowing
discovery of biases or prejudice in prospective jurors.'" State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). See also State v. James, 819 P.2d
781,797-98 (Utah 1991). The trial court's approach was the opposite, keeping biases and
prejudices secret.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISALLOWANCE OF VOIR
DIRE QUESTIONING ON ISSUES OF MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE CASES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR SINCE
IT SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED THE ALCAZARS'
RIGHT TO THE INFORMED EXERCISE OF THEIR
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
In Barrett, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and
remanded the case for a new trial. Barrett at 104. Rejecting the standard requirement that
plaintiff show that an absence of error would have resulted in a different outcome, the court
ruled that in the context of voir dire questioning, prejudicial error is shown if the plaintiffs
right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been substantially impaired:
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable
limitation of voir dire substantially impaired his ability to
exercise peremptory challenges simply cannot prove, in the
traditional way, that prejudice resulted from the error. Appellant
cannot show with any certainty that had certain questions been
asked, particular responses would have been received; that
certain jurors would then have been challenged for cause or
peremptorily; and that particular, more favorably predisposed
jurors would have been seated instead, who would have
deliberated to a different result. Accordingly, in this context, we
apply the test enunciated in Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown
-13-

if the appellant's right to the informed exercise of peremptory
challenges has been "substantially impaired." 758 P.2d at 933.
Barrett at 103.
In reversing the trial court in Barrett, the court of appeals distinguished Evans,
where the court had determined the trial court's error in limiting voir dire harmless. Evans
at 468. The court noted that Evans must have been a "close call" and that the factors which
must have permitted the Evans court to determine the voir dire problems there harmless, were
not present in Barrett. Barrett at 103. These included the fact that the trial court in Evans
actually mentioned articles and television programs to jurors and asked jurors whether they
had strong feelings about lawsuits against doctors:
Now, many of you have heard and read articles, and there have
been television programs, with regard to negligence on the part
of doctors. Do any of you have any strong feelings as a result of
seeing or reading anything about medical negligence that would
make it so that you couldn't be fair and impartial here today?
Now do any of you have any strong feelings about anyone
bringing a lawsuit against a doctor?
Evans at 463. Significantly, in response to this questioning, two potential jurors indicated
they could not be impartial, and they were excused for cause. Id. at 468. Barrett then noted,
The record in this case, by contrast, reveals that despite
appellant's submission of supplemental voir dire questions
accompanied by a supporting memorandum, no pertinent
questions regarding tort-reform and medical negligence issues
were asked, even indirectly, nor were such matters even touched
upon by the trial court. In view of our earlier Conclusion that
appellant was denied an opportunity to ferret out jurors who had
been exposed to tort-reform material, and was prevented from
further questioning of such jurors, appellant's ability to
-14-

intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges was
substantially impaired. The factors which permitted the Evans
court, in what must have been a close call, to determine that the
voir dire problems there were harmless, are simply not present
here. In the instant case, the overall voir dire was much less
extensive. Moreover, in contrast to Evans, the trial court did not
so much as mention the subject of articles and programs on
medical negligence, nor did it verbalize the concept of lawsuits
against doctors prompting discernible emotions.

Barrett at 103. (Emphasis added).
As in Barrett, in the case at bar, the trial court asked no meaningful question
that would elicit disclosure by prospective jurors of exposure to information on medical
negligence cases and their effect.

Like Barrett, the court did not even comment about

articles and television programs on medical negligence nor "verbalize the concept of lawsuits
against doctors prompting discernible emotions." The court made clear its intention that no
such matters be suggested to prospective jurors and it enforced that intention. It rejected all
of Plaintiffs' proposed voir dire regarding what the jurors had read, heard, and/or seen about
articles and programs on medical negligence, of doctors leaving the practice of medicine, or
of rising malpractice and health insurance costs. Also, at side bar at the end of the court's
in-court voir dire, the court again rebuffed the Alcazars' last-ditch pleas for Barrett and
Evans voir dire. R. 650, 112. The court's approach violated the Utah Court of Appeals'
holdings in Barrett and Evans, and substantially impaired the Alcazars' ability to the
informed exercise of their peremptory challenges.
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Undoubtedly, Appellees will respond that the trial court engaged in a thorough
voir dire that should make up for rejection of the Alcazars' Barrett and Evans voir dire. This
is not the case. The trial court's in-court voir dire was brief, and, more importantly, did not
attempt to elicit, and did not elicit, anything about what the prospective jurors had read seen
or heard on issues of medical negligence cases. R. 758, pp. 3-68. The court then had many
of the prospective jurors back in chambers on an individual basis, to discuss myriad issues,
including health problems of the jurors and their loved ones, hardships in serving, prejudices
against smokers, prejudices against Hispanics, a fiance's conviction of a crime, satisfaction
or disatisfaction of medical care received, experience with legal matters, and employment
in the medical field. R. 758, pp. 70-122.
Near the end of the individual interviews, one prospective juror, Mr. Oldham
acknowledged that his wife worked for a pediatrician. R. 758, p. 115:21-24. Given that, the
Alcazars' counsel, with trepidation, did venture to ask whether she had expressed any
negative feelings about medical malpractice cases and whether he had any feelings about that
one way or another. Id. 115:25-116:5. Mr. Oldham, however, did not sit as a juror. In fact,
none of the empaneled jury were asked or revealed anything about their exposure to reports
or discussion of medical negligence cases. R. 758 p. 132:6-12. Only one of the jurors,
Bradley Heaton, was even brought back to chambers for individual questioning. Id. and
116:18-122:12. Thus, a whole jury was allowed to sit in judgment of a medical negligence
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case without plaintiffs having any knowledge of the jurors' exposure to reports of a medical
malpractice crisis.
CONCLUSION
The trial court violated stare decisis and erred by declining to follow the
holdings in Barrett and Evans. Given the prevalence of reports and discussions of medical
negligence cases and their impact, the Utah Court of Appeals established the right of
plaintiffs to voir dire that elicits information about prospective jurors' exposure to and biases
from such reports. The trial court rejected the Alcazars' Barrett and Evans voir dire and
determined that the jury would not be exposed to such questioning. The trial court's error
was prejudicial since the Alcazar's right to intelligent exercise of their peremptory challenges
was substantially impaired.
WHEREFORE, the Alcazars respectfully request that the Utah Court of
Appeals reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2007.

Matthew H. Raty, Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was
served upon appellee's counsel at the address listed below, by depositing the same in the
United States mail, postage pre-paid on the 30th day of November, 2007.
Attorney for Appellees
David G. Williams
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
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ADDENDUM
Addendum 1:

R. 359-363, Plaintiffs' First Amended Requested Voir Dire of Potential
Jurors.

Addendum 2:

R. 560, pp. 3:6-4:19,7:24-10:10, Trial Court's oral ruling on Plaintiffs'
requested voir dire.
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CRESCENCIO ALCAZAR AND
MONICA ALCAZAR,

v.

]
]
)
])
)
]

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITALS &
CLINICS, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT, JON
MIDDLETON, M.D., and STATE OF
UTAH,

;
;)
]
;)
;

Defendants.

]

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED
REQUESTED VOIR DIRE OF
POTENTIAL JURORS

Case No. 030928457
Judge: John Paul Kennedy

Plaintiffs propose the following Voir Dire questions, assuming the court conducts Voir Dire.
If the court allows attorney Voir Dire, then counsel may ask variations of the following questions:
Question No. 1.

Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper method of resolving disputes

concerning compensation for negligent medical care? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc. ,781
P.2d 445 (Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 2.

Have any of you watched, read, or heard anything that suggests a

"lawsuit crisis" or the need for "tort reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993);
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in chambers].
a.

Do you think the article, program, etc. made some good points?

b.

Did you agree with the points made? Please explain [in chambers].

c.

Would you be inclined to reduce the damage award, if any, in this case, because of

what you have watched, read or heard? Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 3,

Have any of you watched, read or heard anything which suggests that

jury verdicts are too high or unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of
jurors in chambers.)
a.

Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are unreasonable?

b.

Do you believe that monetary limits should be placed upon the amounts which a jury

can award to an individual who sues for personal injuries?
Question No. 4.

Would you be hesitant to award compensation for any of the following

elements of damages, provided you first find that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof to be
entitled to damages:
1.

Past medical expenses?

2.

Pain and suffering including loss of enjoyment of life?

Question No. 5.

Have any of you watched, read, or heard anything to indicate that jury

verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury or medical malpractice cases result in higher insurance
premiums, effect the availability of insurance, or result in higher medical costs for consumers?
Barrett v. Peterson, 868P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991).
Please explain [in chambers].
a.

What do you remember about it? Please explain [in chambers].

b.

Do you think the article, program, etc. made some good points? Please explain [in

chambers].
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c.

Do you personally believe that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury cases

result in higher insurance premiums or effect the availability of insurance?

Please explain [in

chambers]. Barrett v. Peterson, 868P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah
App. 1991).
Question No. 6.

Do you have any negative thoughts or feelings towards those who

smoke?
Question No. 7

Would you be less inclined to award damages to someone who suffered

a heart attack from medical malpractice if that person had been a smoker?
Question No. 8.

Do any of you have any negative feelings about lawyers who seek

compensation for those who have suffered medical malpractice? Please explain.
Question No. 9.

Do you believe that as a juror you should be able to disregard the law

and decide a case based on your own beliefs? Please explain.
Question No. 10.

Have you or any of your family ever been, or are you now, a patient

of Dr. Middleton, Dr. Hartsell or the University of Utah Hospital? If yes, explain who was a patient
and when?
Question No. 11.

Have you or any of your close relatives or friends worked or do you

or they now work in any aspect of the insurance industry (insurance salesman, employee of an
insurance company, adjuster, underwriter, or anything similar)? Please explain. If yes, would that
effect the way you might view this case? Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991).
Question No. 12.

Have you or any close relatives or friends been involved, or are you

or they now involved in any way in the health-care industry (e.g., doctor, nurse, employed by a clinic,
etc.)? Please explain. If yes, would that in any way tend to influence your judgment in this case?
Explain.

3

Question No. 13,

Has any juror here been a party to a civil lawsuit? As a result of that

experience do you believe that you would be more sympathetic to one party or the other?
Question No. 14.

Is there anyone who cannot put aside private views and concerns and

deliberate this case using solely the law given to you by the court and the evidence presented by the
parties?
Question No. 15.

Have you or a close friend or relative ever been sued in a medical

malpractice lawsuit? Please explain.
Question No. 16.

Is there any juror who feels that his or her religion, expressly or

impliedly, forbids or discourages a lawsuit brought for money damages as a result of personal
injuries? [Pursue questions in chambers.]
Question No. 17

Do you have any negative thoughts or feelings towards individuals

from Mexico who are living in the United States?
Question No. 18

Would it be more difficult for you to render a verdict in this case

because the defendants are the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics and the State of Utah?
Question No. 19

If you were either of the parties in this case, would you be

comfortable knowing that someone like you would be sitting on the jury.
DATED this 7

day of November, 2006.

MATTHEW H. RATY
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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1

would make it difficult for you to serve, we ask them about

2

hardship.

3

substance.

4

nature of the case is and we'll ask them also if there's a

5

reason they can't serve.

6

And number 17, we would allocate that one in
Number 18, we will explain to them what the

So that's what I'm going to do with those.

Let's

7

see here, I thought we had some from the plaintiff and I

8

apparently don't have those with me here for some reason.

9
10
11
12

MR. RATY:

Can I bring you some, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah, if you have a set, bring them up
here and I'll run through them.
MR. RATY:

In fact I made just a few additions to

13

the list I gave you before.

14

amended one.

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. RATY:

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

So I'm going to give you our

It's almost entirely the same.
Number one, I usually give one,

or ask a question that's similar to that.

19 I that one in substance.

So probably give

Number two, I don't give that

20

instruction.

Number three, or two b, and c, I wouldn't give

21

those either as a followup.

22

that one either and I wouldn't give number four, although, I

23

give an instruction, or I give, I think there's an

24

instruction as well as a voir_ dire ^question--that-as^s-theirr

25

something like, you know, do you have any reason why you

Number three, I wouldn't give

1

wouldn't be able to award damages if you found that there was

2

negligence or words to that effect.

3

give that one.

4

addition, isn't it?

5

MR. RATY:

6

THE COURT: I probably would give that one in this

Number five, I wouldn't

Number six, that, that I think is an
I don't remember seeing that one before.
Right.

7

case.

I don't think I would give number seven.

I won't give

8

number eight, but I do give an instruction that tells them

9

that the lawyers are not on trial here.

And we give them an

10

instruction on number 9 as well as a voir dire question that

11

asks them if they feel they couldn't follow the instructions.

12

So give that one in substance.

13

they have any familiarity with the defendants, including Jon

14

Middleton, the doctor in this case who as I understand it

15

who's no longer in the case.

16

11.

17

medical profession, and same thing with number 12, I ask that

18

question in substance, and the same thing with number 13,

19

number 14, number 15.

20

doesn't focus on religion, but it says do you have any

21

feelings or beliefs, I think is how it's worded.

Number 10, we'll ask them if

I'm not going to give number

I will ask them if they have any experience with the

I ask a question on number 16 that

22

Number 17, the problem with that question is this:

23

people are going to say in answer to it, well, it depends on

24

whether they're here illegally or not.

25

who are going to say that and we can't ask the defendant - or

There's some people

1

the plaintiff in this case whether they're here illegally or

2

not, and because of what the answer is likely to be.

3

don't, I don't want to ask a question that I can't resolve.

4

I don't want to leave it open and it'll, I think it'll create

5

more problems than it will resolve.

6
7

MR. RATY: Could we fashion something [inaudible] I
believe he's here legally.

[inaudible]

8

THE COURT: I wouldn't count on it.

9

MR. RATY:

We've got a -

10

THE COURT: Have you talked to him about it?

11

MR. RATY:

12

THE COURT: Have you seen his papers?

13

MR. RATY:

14
15

So I

We've got -

We've got a State of Utah identification

card for him.
THE COURT: Yeah, yeah. Okay.

The, you're just

16

digging the hole deeper basically when you start going into

17

stuff like that.

18

defendants to start to investigate this guy and find out what

19

they can find out.

20

way or the other.

21

even have some on the jury panel.

22

in the past, from, who are Hispanic origin and maybe here

23

even illegally.

24 f order to serve.
25

And you're, and you're telling the

I just don't think it's productive one
There, there are enough here and we may
I don't know.

We've had

Although, they're supposed to be citizens in
But I just ask them_ if_ you^ you know,—are

you a citizen and if they answer yes, I don't probe it, and -

1

MR. RATY:

Your Honor, what about a question like

2

do you have any negative thoughts or feelings towards those

3

of the Hispanic race and towards Hispanics?

4

THE COURT: Well, we're gonna ask them if they are,

5

if they're free from any prejudice, bias, or sympathy, if

6

they feel that they meet that standard and I'm going to

7

instruct them on that, and I think that the more you focus on

8

the issue, the more you make it an issue, I think.

9

if you have any concern during voir dire that someone may

So I, if,

10

have some bias or prejudices, including a national origin or

11

any other kind of prohibited bias or prejudice, I'd like you

12

to raise that and we can call somebody in specifically and

13

talk to them separately, ask them point blank if you want to

14

even how they would feel about that.

15

is that you're just going to create problems by starting to

16

go into this area in a generic kind of way.

17

But, you know, my sense

And the same thing with number 18, we're basically,

18

we're identifying who the parties are, asking if they have

19

any connection or any experiences involving the parties and

20

so, and then we're asking them if they feel they can, you

21

know, render a verdict that would be un-influenced by

22

prejudice or sympathy or bias.

23

question.

24

BYU who raises his hand on that one because he doesn_'tJLike

25

the

X

So I think we ask that

What I would be afraid of is you get somebody from

U' or something.

I, you know, and I don't, I don't know

1

that it would matter when it comes down to the ultimate

2

decision.

3

And question 19, I ask that in substance.

4 I

MR. RATY:

5

May I ask about a couple others real

quick?

6

THE COURT: Sure.

7

MR. RATY:

8

THE COURT: Yeah, we're on the record.

9

MR. RATY:

10
11
12
13
14

ourselves.

And are we on the record, or -

Okay, I don't know if we identified

I'm Matthew Raty for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Okay, yes, thank you.

Go ahead.

Let's

have the appearance of the defendants as well.
MR. WILLIAMS:

David Williams and Brad Black for

defendants.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

MR. RATY:

17

So -

The first question I had, I didn't hear

you say what you're going to do with number 15.

18

THE COURT: Number, which number?

19

MR. RATY:

20 I

THE COURT: I'm going to ask them if they've ever

Fifteen.

21

been a plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit, or had a close

22

friend or relative.

23

malpractice.

24
25

So we're going to cover a lot more than

We'll cover everything.

MR. RATY:

Okay, and then. Your Honor, on the-

first, first part questions, which get at prejudice regarding

1

medical malpractice cases.

2

THE COURT: I don't know that they get into

3

prejudice.

I think they end up raising issues that most

4

people don't know about and, and it makes, and suggest things

5

to people that they may not have considered and I think the

6

suggestions are not appropriate, so that's why I don't give

7

them.

8

by plaintiffs or by defense because I think they're

9

calculated to try to influence the jury and I don't, I don't

I don't give them either - they'll submit it typically

10

feel that I want to do that.

11

through the questions that I will ask them and they give

12

their answers that you will be able to tell if there is some

13

bias or prejudice that would be, that would reflect the kind

14

of thing that you're concerned about in asking these

15

questions.

16

that he's been able to, or she's been able to ferret that

17

out.

18

I think you will find as we go

So I've never had a lawyer yet who hasn't felt

So I'm, as I said before, when I talked to you

19

before about your voir dire questions that there's certain

20

questions that I just don't give that I think are calculated

21

to influence the jury or to kind of till the soil for you to

22

sow seeds and I know a lot of lawyers like to do that and I

23 I think there are probably seminars that tell you how to do
24 I that and I'm just telling you that irL this case, and other25

cases that you might have with me in the future, I won't do
8

1
2
3

that.
MR. RATY:

Could I - and I don't want to argue with

you on this point, Your Honor -

4

THE COURT: Well then don't.

5

MR. RATY:

6

THE COURT: If you want to make a record, go ahead.

7

MR. RATY:

Then don't?

Can I say one last thing.

Okay, just very briefly, I think there's

8

a fine balance between suggesting things to the jury pool and

9

discovering prejudices and biases, which would allow us to

10

intelligently exercise our peremptory challenges, and I think

11

that case law, Your Honor, and I've cited several of those

12

cases, support the need, especially in our present climate so

13

much discussion about doctors going out of business because

14

of medical malpractice cases, and -

15

THE COURT: I mean do you want to tell the panel,

16

are you worried about doctors going out of business because

17

of medical malpractice?

18

to put in their mind?

Is that the kind of thought you want

19

MR. RATY:

Well, what I'm afraid of is this -

20

THE COURT: You want to put in their mind that your

21

medical costs are going to go up because of, you know, it's

22

like saying to a kid don't put beans in your ears, you know,

23

they're going to say, "Hey, that's an idea", you know, and

24

that's what you' re doing *_ a.adL I~ thinJc- it - can- hurt - the

25

plaintiff as much as it can hurt the defendant and it makes,

1

it creates kind of a random damage outcome that you can't

2

predict, and again I've seen enough juries over the last 40

3

years, that you know, I think I know how they generally react

4

and I think in this instance, as I said before, you will know

5

which people to challenge peremptorily by the time we get to

6

that point.

7

probably, and by the end of the, the end of the morning

8

you're going to know and you'll be able to exercise your

9

challenges, I think, very intelligently and wisely and I

We're going to spend all morning doing that,

10

think it goes for both sides.

11

MR. RATY:

12

THE COURT: What I'll do at the end of these

And on that point, Your Honor, are you -

13

questions I'll say to you come up here.

14

I'll say now are there any questions you want to ask that you

15

feel you haven't had a chance to really get a reaction, and

16

almost inevitably the lawyers will say no at that point.

17

Occasionally they'll say, well, juror number 15 said

18

something about a brother-in-law working for a law office,

19

could we go into that, or something and we'll pursue that

20

item.

I will often pursue those questions as we're going

21

along.

But if I don't, you can come up and tell me you'd

22

like to ask somebody about something.

23

be overly concerned about that and I would, you know, again,

24

I've told you my view on it. So -

25

MR. RATY:

You'll come up and

So I, you know, don't

Can I ask you about your methodology on10

